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THE FIRST AMENDMENT, COMMON CARRIERS,  
AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS:  
NET NEUTRALITY, DIGITAL PLATFORMS, AND PRIVACY 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
 
Recent prominent judicial opinions have assumed that common car-
riers have few to no First Amendment rights and that calling an actor a 
common carrier or public accommodation could justify limiting its right 
to exclude and mandating that it provide nondiscriminatory access. A re-
view of the history reveals that the underlying law is richer than these 
simple statements would suggest. The principles for determining what 
constitutes a common carrier or a public accommodation and the level of 
First Amendment protection both turn on whether the actor holds itself 
out as serving all members of the public or whether it asserts editorial dis-
cretion over whom to carry or host. This gives putative common carriers 
and public accommodations substantial control over their First Amend-
ment status. The jurisprudence on privacy regulation, quasi-common car-
riers, non-common carriage services, and public accommodations con-
firms that the First Amendment protections they enjoy are substantial.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, prominent judges have placed increasing focus on the precise 
extent of common carriers’ First Amendment rights. For example, the topic fig-
ured prominently in the debate over network neutrality, making an appearance in 
the D.C. Circuit’s decision upholding the Federal Communications Commis-
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sion’s (FCC’s) 2015 Open Internet Order1 and in the exchange between the au-
thors of that opinion and then-Judge Kavanaugh when the court denied the peti-
tions for rehearing en banc.2 More recently, Justice Thomas’s opinion in Biden v. 
Knight First Amendment Inst. suggests that social media platforms such as Twitter 
could be considered common carriers or public accommodations, two types of 
entities that have historically been subject to greater limits on their right to ex-
clude.3 
The mode of analysis suggested by Justice Thomas naturally raises two sets of 
questions. First, when does the law permit an actor to be categorized as a common 
carrier or a public accommodation? Second, what are the First Amendment im-
plications of placing an actor into one of those categories? The historical nature of 
the arguments advanced by the D.C. Circuit and Justice Thomas makes their va-
lidity turn largely on the provenance of these doctrinal questions. 
I. WHAT CONSTITUTES COMMON CARRIERS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS? 
The necessary first step in the analysis is determining when the law regards an 
entity as a common carrier or public accommodation. Although neither category 
is susceptible to easy definition, the principles governing each end up being re-
markably similar. 
A. Common Carriage 
The definition of a common carrier has long proven elusive.4 Justice Thom-
as’s opinion in Knight provides a representative list of the types of considerations 
that have historically been used to define common carriers: market power, wheth-
er an industry is “affected with the public interest,” whether the entity regulated is 
part of the transportation or communications industry, whether it receives coun-
tervailing benefits from the government, and whether the actor holds itself out as 
 
1 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA), 825 F.3d 674, 739–44 (D.C. Cir. 2016) . 
2 Compare id. at 388–93 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Srinivasan, J., joined by Tatel, J., concurring in the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc), with id. at 426–35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
3 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1222–23 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (agreeing with the decision to 
grant the petition for certiorari and remand the case with instructions to dismiss it as moot). 
4 For an earlier exploration of these themes, see Christopher S. Yoo, Common Carriage’s Do-
main, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 991, 994–97 (2018); Christopher S. Yoo, Is There a Role for Common 
Carriage in an Internet-Based World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 552–63 (2013) [Yoo, Role for Com-
mon Carriage]. 
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providing service to all.5 As Justice Thomas concedes, many of these definitions 
remain unsatisfactory.6 
1. Monopoly power 
One of the most frequently asserted definitions of common carriers turns on 
the presence of monopoly power. The USTA majority rejected this proposition7 
while Justice Thomas’s Knight opinion8 and the dissents in the D.C. Circuit deci-
sions regarding the 2010 and 2015 Open Internet Orders9 accepted it. Scholars 
have long disputed whether common carriage depends on the possession of mo-
nopoly power. Although some commentators have asserted that natural monopo-
ly constitutes the defining characteristic of common carriers, other scholars have 
found monopoly power not to be an essential aspect of common carriage.10 
The history of how monopoly power entered the discourse of common car-
riage is documented admirably by Joseph Singer, who points out that historically 
the presence or absence of monopoly power played no role in determining wheth-
er an actor was a common carrier.11 Instead, the monopoly theory was the brain-
child of Bruce Wyman, who articulated it in a 1904 Harvard Law Review article 
attempting to reconcile the long history of restrictive regulation of common carri-
ers with the emerging Lochnerian vision of freedom of contract and inviolable 
property rights in an attempt to stave off progressive calls for comprehensive reg-
ulation of all businesses.12 Monopoly theory made a more comfortable fit with the 
 
5 Knight First Amendment Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1222–23 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
6 Id. at 1223, 1225. 
7 USTA, 825 F.3d at 708. 
8 Knight First Amendment Inst., 141 S. Ct. at 1222, 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
9 USTA, 825 F.3d at 744–54 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Verizon 
v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 663–66 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
10 For interesting overviews of this debate, see Adam Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: 
Common Carriage, Network Neutrality, and Section 230, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 391, 404–05 (2020); 
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1332–34 (1998); James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet 
Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 255–58 (2002). 
11 Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1309, 1319–20, 1409 (1996). 
12 Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV. 
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emerging classical conception of property than did holding out theory.13 Despite 
the validity of Burdick’s and Adler’s arguments that common carriage had histor-
ically never depended on monopoly power,14 the consonance of Wyman’s views 
with the classical vision and with the emerging racial politics supporting broader 
rights to exclude,15 later bolstered by the emerging economic concept of natural 
monopoly,16 led his views to emerge as more influential. 
Natural monopoly may well represent the most coherent theoretical justifica-
tion for common carriage regulation. But Justice Thomas’s argument is primarily 
historical, and viewed purely as a matter of history, the claim that common carrier 
status does not depend on monopoly appears to have the better of the argument. 
For example, railroads serving long-haul routes on which multiple providers 
competed for business were still regarded as common carriers notwithstanding 
the fact that they faced competition, as did cabs, inns, and trucks.17 This conclu-
sion is reinforced by the fact that none of the standard judicial definitions of 
common carriage depend on the presence of market power.18  
That said, the FCC has sometimes considered whether a firm “has sufficient 
market power to warrant regulatory treatment as a common carrier,”19 a conclu-
sion endorsed by the dissenting opinions in the judicial decisions reviewing both 
 
L. REV. 217, 232–40 (1904); see also Singer, supra note 11, at 1403–04, 1407. 
13 Id. at 1410. 
14 Edward A. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REV. 135, 148 (1914); Charles K. Bur-
dick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 518–25 
(1911). 
15 Singer, supra note 11, at 1300, 1409–10. 
16 On the emergence of natural monopoly as the justification for public utility regulation, see 
Manuela Mosca, On the Origins of the Concept of Natural Monopoly: Economics of Scale and Com-
petition, 15 EUR. J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 317, 337–39 (2008). 
17 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 131–48 (1991); 
Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1388–89; Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 96–100 (2008); Speta, supra note 10, at 259. 
18 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 
1976); Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 641, 642 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). 
19 V.I. Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (evaluating an FCC order considering market power when applying the definition of common 
carriage). 
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the 2010 and 2015 Open Internet Orders.20 The FCC also relied on the absence of 
market power in the 2018 Restoring Internet Freedom Order when reversing 
course and ruling that last-mile ISPs do not represent common carriers.21 This 
suggests that market power may have some role to play notwithstanding the his-
torical evidence to the contrary. 
2. Industries affected with a public interest 
The Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that whether a company is a 
common carrier depends on whether it is “affected with a public interest,” using 
the language commonly associated with Munn v. Illinois.22 Those who invoke it 
overlook the fact that the Court abandoned it in Nebbia v. New York,23 a conclu-
sion the Court reinforced in the context of regulated industries in Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co.24  
A moment’s reflection makes all too clear the reasons why the Court “dis-
carded”25 this line of jurisprudence. As an initial matter, this doctrine is properly 
understood as a Lochner-era construct used to justify limited derogations from the 
strict freedom of contract and control of property that the Four Horsemen in-
voked to strike down a wide range of economic regulation.26 The death of substan-
tive due process protection as a strong limit on economic regulation eliminated 
the need for this doctrine and discredited it at the same time.27 
On a more practical level, the test has long been recognized as indeterminate. 
The Munn majority indicated that the category included industries such as ferries, 
 
20 See supra notes 9 and accompanying text 
21 Mozilla v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 57–58 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
22 94 U.S. 113, 126, 127, 129, 130, 139, 150, 152 (1876). 
23 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). 
24 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (quoting Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536). 
25 Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236, 245 (1941). 
26 See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Small Differences?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1097, 1100–01, 1100 n.12 
(2002) (arguing that the Four Horsemen were more permissive of labor regulations for “business-
es affected with a public interest” and “interstate common carriers”). 
27 Yoo, Role for Common Carriage, supra note 4, at 556; Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and De-
mise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 333 (2003); 
Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hid-
den Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1882–83 (2007). 
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wharves, warehouses, taverns, inns, mills, bridges, and turnpike roads.28 This in 
turn prompted a complaint from Justice Field that it could as easily have included 
industries as diverse as housing, textile manufacturing, the construction of ma-
chinery, and the printing of books.29 Subsequent decisions included such various 
fields as banking, fire insurance, and the wholesale marketing of ice.30  
The indeterminacy prompted grand judicial attempts31 and treatise-length 
analyses trying to synthesize the various factors into a coherent system.32 Finally, 
the Nebbia Court recognized that “there is no closed class or category of business-
es affected with a public interest.”33 Jackson reiterated this conclusion, holding 
that the concept of “affected with a public interest” was “not susceptible of defini-
tion, and form[ed] an unsatisfactory test.”34 It thus comes as no surprise that Jus-
tice Thomas dismissed this concept as “hardly helpful, for most things can be de-
scribed as ‘of public interest.’”35 Commentators sympathetic to expanding regula-
tion in this space have similarly noted the concept’s shortcomings and sought to 
justify common carriage on other grounds.36  
3. Transportation and communications 
Justice Thomas further noted that “whatever may be said of other industries, 
there is clear historical precedent for regulating transportation and communica-
tions networks in a similar manner as traditional common carriers.”37 Scholars 
 
28 Munn, 94 U.S. at 126–30. 
29 Id. at 140–41 (Field, J., dissenting). 
30 Yoo, Role for Common Carriage, supra note 4, at 556 (citing cases). 
31 Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923). 
32 FORD P. HALL, THE CONCEPT OF A BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST (1940). 
33 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536. 
34 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (quoting Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536). 
35 Biden v. Knight First Amendment Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1223 (2021) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). 
36 See, e.g., Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 369, 
382–83 (2004); Candeub, supra note 10, at 405; Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 2343, 2366–68 (2014); Nachbar, supra note 17, at 79–81; Kevin Werbach, The 
Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1790–91 (2011). 
37 Knight, 141 S. Ct. at 1223. 
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have raised similar arguments in the past.38 
Such simple descriptive categories raise important conceptual questions even 
when they are descriptively accurate. As Susan Crawford notes, “But the mere 
existence of a long history of state involvement with transport does not necessari-
ly tell us what the principled basis of that involvement is. Highways have ‘always 
been governmental affairs,’ but scholars have not been able to determine why.”39 
Perhaps the most eloquent statement of the importance of going beyond the 
superficial contours of a rule and understanding its theoretical foundations comes 
from Holmes’s The Path of the Law, in which he recounts the story of a Vermont 
justice of the peace who ruled in favor of a farmer who broke another farmer’s 
butter churn because “he had looked through the statutes and could find nothing 
about churns,” a problem Holmes saw being replicated “under the head of Rail-
roads or Telegraphs.”40 Simply gathering principles “under an arbitrary title 
which is thought likely to appeal to the practical mind” provides little purchase 
“to discern the true basis for prophecy.”41  
The proper approach to understanding the law begins with “discover[ing] 
from history how it has come to be what it is,” but then proceeds with “consid-
er[ing] the ends which the several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those 
ends are desired, what is given up to gain them, and whether they are worth the 
price.”42 The problem posed with simply accepting the historical contours is that 
“[w]e have too little theory in the law rather than too much.”43 Understanding the 
underlying principles is what guides the application of law to new situations and 
technologies. Relying on tradition without such an understanding devolves into a 
 
38 See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 885, 915 (2009); 
Nachbar, supra note 17, at 103–09; Speta, supra note 10, at 252–53, 255, 257; Richard S. Whitt, 
Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 491–92 (2009); Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? 
Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 30–31 
(2006). 
39 Crawford, supra note 38, at 884. 
40 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 474–75 (1897). 
41 Id. at 475. 
42 Id. at 476. 
43 Id. 
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thin Burkean conservatism44 deserving of Holmes’s classic retort, “It is revolting 
to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time 
of Henry IV.”45 Measured by this standard, Crawford’s attempt to infer from the 
history of common carriage a vague “instinct” to subject providers of transport to 
nondiscrimination obligations46 ultimately proves unsatisfactory. 
A brief examination of the transportation and communication industries re-
veals numerous difficulties with relying on transportation and communications as 
the measure of common carriage. Regarding transportation, Joseph Kearney and 
Thomas Merrill note, “By the 1970s, this consensus [supporting nondiscrimina-
tion mandates for transportation] was crumbling,” led by the deregulation of the 
airlines, followed by railroads and trucking, and capped by the abolition of the 
iconic Interstate Commerce Commission.47 For mass media communications, the 
Supreme Court has refused to apply common carriage regulation to broadcast and 
cable television even though both are forms of communications.48 Even with re-
spect to telephony, criticism of common carriage has led regulators to cut back on 
its scope since the 1970s49 and to create numerous premium and special access 
tariffs that fall outside of common carriage.50 The emergence of new technologies 
has caused increasing pressure on the supposed distinction between mass media 
and common carriage.51 The Internet has caused it to collapse entirely, as the 
 
44 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale 
2003) (1790). 
45 Holmes, supra note 40, at 469. 
46 Crawford, supra note 38, at 915–16. 
47 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1335–37. 
48 See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105–06, 110, 116 (1973) (broadcast-
ing); FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700–02, 706–09 (1979) (cable). Congress has 
enacted statutes barring treating broadcasters and cable operators as common carriers. 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 153(11) (broadcasting), 541(c) (cable). 
49 Yoo, supra note 4, at 551–52, 583–601; Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1335, 1337–39. 
50 See. e.g., Ajit Pai, The Story of the FCC’s Net Neutrality Decision and Why It Won’t Stand 
Up in Court, 67 FED. COMM. L.J. 147, 158 n.64 (2015) (providing examples). As we shall see, the 
omission of premium services from common carriage played a key role in the First Amendment 
treatment of dial-a-porn. See infra note 186 and accompanying text. 
51 For an observation of this phenomenon during the early years of convergence, see Howard 
A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional “Broadcast” and Wireless “Carriage,” 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1997). 
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same medium can now transmit any form of communications.  
The example animating Justice Thomas’s concurrence vividly illustrates the 
difficulties in applying this rationale to boundary cases and emerging technolo-
gies. Social media companies are communications firms in some generalized way, 
but they arguably host content in much the same way as traditional publishers, 
more than they transmit content in the manner of traditional telecommunications 
firms. Terms such as “transportation” or “communications” provide little help in 
determining whether social media constitute common carriage. In the words of 
Adam Candeub offered in an article cited prominently by Justice Thomas, “It is a 
fair riposte to these ideas that they are descriptive at too general a level and fail to 
provide a convincing rule of decision.”52 
4. Quid pro quo 
Justice Thomas suggests that common carriage status may be a quid pro quo 
for “special government favors” such as “immunity from certain types of suits” or 
franchises and other regulations that protect the company from competition.53 
Courts and commentators have sometimes offered similar views.54 
Such explanations are generally unconvincing. Consider immunity from def-
amation suits. Such a quid pro quo is unnecessary for content that the govern-
ment requires a firm to carry because of the simple unfairness of holding it liable 
 
52 Candeub, supra note 10, at 405. He illustrates his point by asking, “How involved in trans-
portation or communications must an industry be before it becomes a common carrier. Why pri-
vate car services but not Uber? Why wireline phones but not wireless? Teasing out common car-
riage law’s definitional criteria may be, in the end, desultory.” Id. 
53 Biden v. Knight First Amendment Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1223 (2021) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). 
54 On limitation of liability, see, e.g., W. Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566, 
571 (1921); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 641–42 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) ; Candeub, supra note 10, at 395, 403, 406, 412; Rob Frieden, Schizophrenia 
Among Carriers: How Common and Private Carriers Trade Places, 3 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 19, 19 (1997). On monopoly, see, e.g., J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATO-
RY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK 
INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 125 (1997); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 168 n.15 (1985); B. Zorina Khan, Antitrust and Innovation 
Before the Sherman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 757, 780–81 (2011). 
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for content that the government says it cannot refuse.55 
Any quid pro quo for alleged monopoly status is undercut by the fact that 
common carriage status applies without regard to whether the firm has market 
power, as noted above.56 And far from protecting monopoly status, modern 
communications statutes affirmatively forbid licensing authorities from issuing 
exclusive franchises.57 The supposed quid pro quo associated with franchises is 
belied by the fact that the company at issue in the leading case on common car-
riage obligations, Munn v. Illinois,58 was not operating under a license or fran-
chise.59 In fact, the Supreme Court selected that case specifically because the entity 
involved was a partnership that was not operating under a state corporate char-
ter.60  
In any event, the Supreme Court has clearly established that any such quid 
pro quo must be spelled out in the license or franchise itself rather than being im-
posed after the fact.61 Indeed, the cable industry never acceded to common car-
riage regulation, instead agreeing to a complex bargain of franchise fees, coverage 
obligations, access mandates, and other requirements that contained only limited 
nondiscrimination requirements.62 
5. Holding out 
Another most widely accepted definition of common carriage turns on 
whether a company holds itself out as serving the entire public.63 Indeed, the lead-
 
55 Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959). See gener-
ally PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 14.6.7, at 1308 (2d ed. 1999). 
56 See supra Part I.A.1. 
57 47 U.S.C. §§ 253, 541(a)(1) (2018). 
58 94 U.S. 113 (1876). 
59 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE 
L.J. 801, 813 (1999). 
60 Id. at 813–14. 
61 For the classic statement, see Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 
546 (1837). For a more modern statement, see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
62 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 531 (public, educational, and governmental access), 532 (leased ac-
cess), 534 (must carry), 542 (franchise fees), 543 (rate regulation), 548 (program access). 
63 For the seminal statement of this argument, see Burdick, supra note 14, at 518–25. For a 
modern restatement, see Singer, supra note 11, at 1304–21. 
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ing case on what constitutes common carriage treats holding oneself out as offer-
ing services to the public, as opposed to making individualized business decisions 
about services, as the crux of what makes a firm a common carrier.64 As the D.C. 
Circuit stated in a different decision, “[T]he sine qua non of a common carrier is 
the obligation to accept applicants on a non-content oriented basis.”65 
The D.C. Circuit’s network neutrality jurisprudence reconfirmed this under-
standing. For example, the decision overturning the Obama Administration’s 
2010 Open Internet Order described the “‘requirement of holding oneself out to 
serve the public indiscriminately’” as the “basic characteristic” of common car-
riage.66  
That court followed a slightly different course when evaluating the 2015 Open 
Internet Order, resolving the issue on statutory rather than common law 
grounds.67 The Communications Act explicitly provides that “[a] telecommunica-
tions carrier shall be treated as a common carrier . . . to the extent that it is en-
gaged in providing telecommunications services,”68 and wireless providers are 
subject to common carriage only if they fit the definition of “commercial mobile 
service” instead of “private mobile service.”69 The Supreme Court had already 
determined that the definition of telecommunications service is ambiguous and 
thus entitled to deference under Chevron.70 The D.C. Circuit held that the FCC’s 
revised interpretation of telecommunications statute ruling that last-mile broad-
 
64 Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC I), 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). 
65 Nat’l Ass’n of Broad. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
66 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 642). 
67 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 710–11 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
68 47 U.S.C. § 153(51). 
69 Id. § 332(c)(1)(A), (2). 
70 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 989–97 (2005). 
Then-Judge Kavanaugh noted that the Supreme Court has sometimes refused to accord Chevron 
deference to “major agency rules of great economic and political significance.” U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n v. FCC (USTA), 855 F.3d 381, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); accord id. at 402–03 (Brown, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(noting the Supreme Court’s refusal to apply Chevron to “‘major question[s]’ of deep economic 
and political significance”). The Supreme Court’s Brand X decision makes this position difficult to 
maintain with respect to the definition of telecommunications service. 
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band service, which the 2015 Order termed broadband Internet access service 
(“BIAS”), was sufficiently reasonable to justify upholding reclassifying BIAS pro-
viders as common carriers.71 For the communications laws, the difference be-
tween the common law and statutory definitions is largely nominal: The statute 
defines telecommunications service as telecommunications offered “for a fee di-
rectly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly 
to the public.”72 The definition of commercial mobile service takes an almost iden-
tical approach.73 
Holding out thus appears to be the most widely accepted common law defini-
tion of common carriage that courts apply in the absence of a specific statutory 
definition. The problem is the ease with which it can be evaded. Companies can 
avoid being treated as common carriers simply by defining their services as not 
being available to the entire public. This makes holding out, in the words of 
Thomas Nachbar, “a conspicuously empty” definition of common carriage.74 In 
addition, it appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition under modern 
communications law. Telecommunications offered to the public become non-
common carriage services known as information services when they are combined 
with advanced functions such as storage or computer processing.75  
B. Public Accommodations 
Public accommodations represent the second type of business identified by 
Justice Thomas whose right to exclude may be limited by the government.76 That 
category, which he acknowledges is related to common carriage, “applies to com-
panies that hold themselves out to the public but do not ‘carry’ freight, passen-
gers, or communications”77 or “provide[] ‘lodging, food, entertainment, or other 
 
71 USTA, 825 F.3d at 701–04, 710–11. 
72 47 U.S.C. §§ 153(51) (emphasis added).  
73 Id. § 332(d)(1) (defining commercial mobile service to be “any mobile service . . . that is 
provided for profit and makes interconnected service available (A) to the public or (B) to such 
classes of eligible users as to be effectively available to a substantial portion of the public”) (empha-
sis added). 
74 Nachbar, supra note 17, at 93. 
75 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). 
76 Biden v. Knight First Amendment Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1223, 1225–26 (2021) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
77 Id. at 1223. 
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services to the public . . . in general.’”78 He acknowledges that “no party has iden-
tified any public accommodation restriction that applies” to social media.79 
1. The common law definition before the Civil War 
The historical pedigree of the scope of public accommodations is somewhat 
more complicated than this proffered synthesis implies. Legal authorities general-
ly acknowledge that the common law definition of public accommodation before 
the Civil War explicitly included innkeepers and common carriers.80 Beyond these 
clear categories lay some ambiguity. These decisions typically relied on the Eng-
lish decision in Lane v. Cotton, which also includes smiths.81 Although some have 
suggested that it also included places of entertainment, members of the U.S. Su-
preme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court thought otherwise.82 
As Joseph Singer notes in his painstaking review of the history of public ac-
commodations, beyond these clear statements with respect to innkeepers and 
common carriers, these early cases did not address the status of other types of 
businesses and offered no general principles delineating what types of entities 
were properly considered public accommodations.83 The case law and leading 
treatises of the day, including Blackstone, Kent, and Story, among others, did not 
explicitly limit public accommodations to these two categories.84 He also reviews 
and rejects rationales based on the fact that entities held licenses or franchises 
from the state,85 were monopolies,86 constituted a “public employment,”87 or were 
 
78 Id. at 1225 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 20 (11th ed. 2019)). 
79 Id. at 1226. 
80 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 298 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisi-
ana, 373 U.S. 267, 279 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Singer, supra note 11, at 1290–93; see also 
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (concluding that at common law, public ac-
commodations included inns and trains). 
81 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 571 
(1995) (citing Lane v. Cotton (1701), 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464–65, 17 Mod. Rep. 472 (K.B.) (Holt, 
C.J.)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (quoting this language from Hurley). 
82 Lombard, 373 U.S. at 279 (Douglas, J., concurring) (concluding that public accommodation 
did not include restaurants and “other places of amusement and resort”); McCrea v. Marsh, 78 
Mass. (12 Gray) 211 (1858). 
83 Singer, supra note 11, at 1294, 1298, 1348. 
84 Id. at 1308–15, 1324. 
85 Id. at 1293, 1306, 1318–21, 1328–29. 
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necessities of travel88 as overinclusive or inconsistent with the caselaw. The most 
plausible explanation and the one on which U.S. courts relied most often, in Sing-
er’s opinion, turned on whether the business held itself out as serving the public.89  
2. Statutory and judicial development following the Civil War 
The scope of what constitutes a public accommodation began to narrow fol-
lowing the Civil War. Although many states initially passed statutes requiring 
places of public accommodation to serve the public without regard to race, many 
courts found that separate-but-equal arrangements satisfied this mandate, and 
Southern states largely repealed these statutes following the end of Reconstruc-
tion.90 Many states, led by Massachusetts, clearly established that the right of ac-
cess did not apply to places of entertainment.91 State courts began interpreting the 
concept of public accommodation narrowly, applying it only to places explicitly 
listed in civil rights statutes.92 Other states abolished the right of access altogether 
and replacing it with a general right to exclude.93  
The effect was to crystallize the understanding that the duties placed on public 
accommodations extended only to innkeepers and common carriers and not to 
other businesses.94 The U.S. Supreme Court effectively condoned this understand-
ing,95 striking down state public accommodations laws as an unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce,96 holding federal public accommodations legisla-
tion to be outside the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment,97 and notoriously up-
holding the constitutionality of a state statute requiring separate-but-equal service 
 
86 Id. at 1293, 1319, 1329. 
87 Id. at 1322, 1330. 
88 Id. at 1322, 1329–30. 
89 Id. at 1292, 1294, 1298, 1315–18, 1331. 
90 Id. at 1299, 1352–86. 
91 Id. at 1390–92, 1339–40, 1344, 1390 (citing, inter alia, Bowlin v. Lyon, 25 N.W. 766 (Iowa 
1885); McCrea v. Marsh, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 211 (1858)). 
92 Id. at 1394–95. 
93 Id. at 1386–88, 1390. 
94 Id. at 1390. 
95 Id. at 1395–1401. 
96 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877). 
97 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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on railways.98 
The jurisprudence of the Lochner era reinforced the idea that businesses had a 
default right to exclude absent a statutory prohibition to the contrary.99 That said, 
rights of access imposed on innkeepers and common carriers represented a pow-
erful challenge to the classical conception of property, which presumes that own-
ers are free to use their property as they see fit.100 Revisionist commentators led by 
Bruce Wyman attempted to reconcile the limitations on the right to exclude im-
posed on public accommodations law with the property rights and freedom of 
contract underlying classical legal thought by reviving the franchise, monopoly, 
public function, and necessity theories of public accommodations.101 Singer suc-
cinctly points out that such rationales have no historical support and are incon-
sistent with the shape of the doctrine.102 For example, the fact that the right to ac-
cess was imposed on innkeepers and common carriers in large cities that faced 
competition and not imposed on other types of providers in small cities that faced 
no competition suggests monopoly power was not the central principle animating 
public accommodations law.103 Similarly, during the post-Civil War era, the state 
required most trades—not just innkeepers and common carriers—to obtain a 
license or permit from the government, making the need for a franchise overin-
clusive.104 
3. Modern statutes 
Since the decline of the classical vision of law, public accommodations law has 
been dominated by statutes. Most notably, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act provide defined lists of locales that constitute 
public accommodations.105 At the same time, many states and municipalities have 
 
98 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
99 Singer, supra note 11, at 1300, 1395, 1401–03. 
100 Id. at 1346. 
101 Id. at 1392, 1404–06, 1409–10. 
102 Id. at 1408–10. 
103 Id. at 1408. 
104 Id. 
105 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)-(3) (including inns, restaurants, gas stations, and places of enter-
tainment); 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (including common carriers, innkeepers, restaurants, places of enter-
tainment, retail stores, offices of physicians and lawyers, laundromats, barber shops, funeral par-
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enacted public accommodations statutes,106 while others have enacted legislation 
authorizing public accommodations to exclude customers at will.107  
Throughout this period, judicial decisions addressing these laws have general-
ly proceeded from the premise that only innkeepers and common carriers have 
duties to serve the public.108 These courts have strengthened this presumption by 
drawing a negative inference from the fact that new statutes tend to include ex-
plicit language enumerating the precise types of locales that constitute public ac-
commodations.109 Attempts to invoke the monopoly, franchise, and right to travel 
theories were no more convincing than during prior eras.110 
C. Summation 
Although Justice Thomas treats common carriage and public accommoda-
tions as distinct concepts, their contours are so similar that the distinction yields 
few insights. As an initial matter, the fact that common carriers are one of two 
types of entities universally accepted as constituting public accommodations 
means that the latter concept is completely inclusive of the former. In addition, 
Justice Thomas agrees with the historically sound conclusions that neither catego-
ry turns on whether the entity in question possesses market power and that 
whether an industry is affected with the public interest provides little insight into 
differentiating common carriers from non-common carriers.111 
 
lors, hospitals, insurance agents, and schools). 
106 These enactments formed the basis for many high-profile civil rights cases. See Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1719, 1725 (2018); Boy Scouts of Am. v. 
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645 (2000); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 561 (1995); N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City 
of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1988); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984). 
107 Singer, supra note 11, at 1438. 
108 Id. at 1439, 1441–43 (citing Alpaugh v. Wolverton, 36 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Va. 1946); Uston v. 
Airport Casino, Inc, 564 F.2d 1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977); Madden v. Queens Cty. Jockey Club, 
Inc., 72 N.E.2d 697, 698 (N.Y. 1947), with Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 375 
(N.J. 1982), serving as a sole counterexample); accord Hurley, 515 U.S. at 571; Romer, 517 U.S. at 
627; Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 298 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lombard v. Louisiana, 
373 U.S. 267, 279 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
109 Singer, supra note 11, at 1441, 1443–44. 
110 Id. at 1441, 1443–46. 
111 Id. at 1223, 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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As a historical matter, the most restrictive interpretation is that public ac-
commodations include only innkeepers and common carriers. Scholars looking 
for a more conceptual foundation have synthesized a test that is remarkably simi-
lar to one developed for common carriers: whether the firm holds itself out as 
providing service to all members of the public or whether they make individual-
ized business decisions about who to serve. This definition necessarily excludes 
any services over which providers wish to exert business judgment over who to 
carry.  
Whatever the propriety of that synthesis, the common law definition of public 
accommodation has become even more restrictive over time. The modern view 
holds that any expansion beyond the traditional categories of innkeepers and 
common carriers requires the enactment of positive law. This includes statutory 
definitions that explicitly refer to common carriage112 or ad hoc access regimes 
often dubbed quasi-common carriage, which are discussed below.113 
II. WHAT FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS DO COMMON CARRIERS AND PUB-
LIC ACCOMMODATIONS ENJOY? 
Determining that an entity may or not be a common carrier or public ac-
commodation does not end the inquiry. The government’s ability to impose 
greater restrictions on digital platforms depends on the extent to which the plat-
forms are protected by the First Amendment. Justice Thomas’s concurrence pro-
ceeds from the assumption, again based largely on history, that neither category 
enjoys much constitutional protection against being required to carry other peo-
ple’s speech. But a closer examination reveals that the law provides greater protec-
tion than he suggests. 
A. Common Carriage 
Although the Supreme Court has never clearly articulated the level of First 
Amendment protection accorded common carriers, it has hinted that the level is 
relatively low.114 For example, in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the 
Court noted, “Unlike common carriers, broadcasters are entitled under the First 
 
112 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
113 See infra Part II.A.2. 
114 See HUBER ET AL., supra note 55, § 14.6.1, at 1279 (noting that the Supreme Court “has 
made noises” that “carriers . . . have not been thought of as deserving much First Amendment 
protection at all,” although it “has never expressly so ruled”). 
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Amendment to exercise the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their pub-
lic duties.”115 The plurality opinion in Denver Area Educational Telecommunica-
tions Consortium, Inc. v. FCC similarly noted that cable operators’ “speech inter-
ests” in leased access channels are “relatively weak because [the companies] act 
less like editors, such as newspapers or television broadcasters, than like common 
carriers, such as telephone companies.”116  
These discussions have led treatise writers to conclude that common carriers 
receive a lower level of First Amendment protection than other forms of commu-
nication.117 Consistent with this, the D.C. Circuit’s 2016 decision upholding the 
FCC’s Open Internet Order observed that “[c]ommon carriers have long been 
subject to nondiscrimination and equal access obligations akin to those imposed 
by the rules without raising any First Amendment question.”118 It similarly noted 
that “[e]qual access obligations” of the kind associated with common carriage 
“have long been imposed on telephone companies . . . without raising any First 
Amendment issue,” citing the language from Denver and League of Women Vot-
ers quoted above as support.119  
Saying that common carriers enjoy less First Amendment protection than 
other forms of communication does not provide clear guidance as to the precise 
level of protection they do receive. A review of the judicial decisions reveals that 
common carriers do enjoy some degree of First Amendment protection with re-
 
115 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984) (emphasis added and alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
116 518 U.S. 727, 739 (1996) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
117 See, e.g., HUBER ET AL., supra note 55, § 6.4.1, at 1279 (describing “a First Amendment tri-
ad” in which common carriers receive less protection than print publishers and broadcasters); 
ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 2, 105–06 (1983) (describing a “trifurcated 
communications system” of print, common carriage, and broadcasting in which the First 
Amendment for common carriers “had simply disappeared” or been “disregarded”); LAURENCE 
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1004 (2d ed. 1988) (noting how “[t]he Constitution’s 
promise of free speech has eroded” for common carriers); HARVEY L. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., MODERN 
COMMUNICATIONS LAW 187 (1999) (observing that common carriers “receive the lowest level of 
First Amendment protection”). 
118 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
119 Id. at 740–41; accord id. at 741 (further noting that the net neutrality rules “impose on 
broadband providers the kind of nondiscrimination and equal access obligations that courts have 
never considered to raise a First Amendment concern”). 
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spect to information generated by their common carriage services as well as by the 
non-common-carriage services that they may choose to provide. This Part will 
also offer thoughts on the ad hoc quasi-common carriage regimes often enacted 
by Congress. 
I will offer one initial observation: As with the definition of common carriage, 
economic power or the presence of absence of monopoly power does not justify 
according an actor a lesser degree of First Amendment protection.120 As Justice 
Douglas noted in CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, the fact that even 
though “[s]ome newspapers in our history have exerted a powerful—and some 
have thought—a harmful interest on the public mind,” government intervention 
to compensate for any such adverse effects “would be the greater of two evils.”121 
A majority of the Court embraced these principles in Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo, which overturned a state statute designed to foster greater balance 
in the political discourse as an impermissible infringement of the newspaper’s free 
speech rights despite the growing prevalence of one-newspaper towns.122  
1. Privacy 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission established that the First Amendment protects 
the commercial speech of public utilities even when they are monopolies.123 The 
Tenth Circuit applied this framework to common carriers in U.S. West, Inc. v. 
FCC when it invalidated the FCC’s initial rules implementing the newly enacted 
privacy provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by requiring opt-in 
consent before telecommunications companies could use customer proprietary 
network information (“CPNI”).124  
The U.S. West court proceeded to apply the traditional framework announced 
 
120 For earlier discussions, see Christopher S. Yoo, Technologies of Control and the Future of 
the First Amendment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 761–67 (2011) [hereinafter Yoo, Technologies 
of Control]; Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 717–51 (2010) [hereinafter Yoo, Myth of the Internet]. 
121 412 U.S. 94, 152–53 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
122 418 U.S. 241, 249, 251, 253 (1974). 
123 447 U.S. 557, 566–68 (1980). 
124 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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in Central Hudson for protecting commercial speech.125 Assuming arguendo that 
the regulation was backed by substantial state interests,126 the court concluded that 
the FCC had failed to demonstrate that the regulation directly and materially ad-
vanced those interests and that opt-out consent represented a less restrictive 
means for accomplishing its goals.127  
Later decisions confirmed the extent to which the First Amendment protects 
the commercial speech of common carriers. Courts invoked commercial speech 
doctrine to strike down state statutes imposing requirements similar to those in-
validated in U.S. West.128 The D.C. Circuit also upheld the FCC’s revised CPNI 
rules after the agency decided to require only opt-out consent and to allow shar-
ing of information with joint venture partners and independent contractors that 
were marketing communications-related services, so long as the disclosed infor-
mation is protected by confidentiality agreements.129 The court’s applying the 
Central Hudson test to uphold the revised rules confirms that the First Amend-
ment presumptively protects the commercial speech of common carriers, even 
though the new rules passed the scrutiny applicable to commercial speech.  
The idea that the First Amendment protects providers’ use of the data they 
collect received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc., in which the Court invalidated a state statute restricting the sale, disclosure, 
and use of data identifying individual doctors’ prescribing practices.130 In so do-
ing, the Court held open the possibility that the use of data may receive even 
greater protection. Concluding that heightened scrutiny was appropriate, the 
Court found that the statute failed regardless of whether the test for commercial 
speech or a more restrictive test was applied.131 
Together, these decisions belie any suggestion that common carriers enjoy lit-
tle-to-no protection under the First Amendment. Although these decisions did 
not address the constitutionality of limiting common carriers’ right to exclude, 
 
125 Id. at 1233. 
126 Id. at 1235–37. 
127 Id. at 1237–39. 
128 Verizon Northwest, Inc. v. Showalter, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
129 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
130 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
131 Id. at 563–74. 
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they did confirm the existence of free speech rights with respect to collateral as-
pects of providing such service. 
2. Quasi-common carriers 
In addition to entities regarded as common carriers at common law, Congress 
has explicitly authorized subjecting telecommunications services to common car-
riage regulation132 while specifically prohibiting the imposition of such duties on 
broadcasting and cable.133 Notwithstanding these restrictions, Congress and the 
FCC have imposed a wide variety of ad hoc nondiscrimination obligations on 
communications providers without using the historical term “common carri-
er.”134 Often called quasi-common carriage duties, examples include obligations 
placed on broadcasters to provide reasonable access and equal time to all candi-
dates for federal office135 and the now defunct Fairness Doctrine,136 as well as the 
must-carry, leased access, and “public, educational, and governmental” (PEG) 
access requirements imposed on cable operators.137  
As Genevieve Lakier notes, the First Amendment has never been interpreted 
to require either the government or private media companies to provide quasi-
common carrier access.138 Thus, absent a revolution in state action doctrine, any 
such interpretation would turn on its head the conception of the First Amend-
ment as a constraint on the government’s ability to influence individuals’ speech 
choices.139 That means the key question is whether the government’s imposition 
 
132 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (limiting common carriage regulation to telecommunications car-
riers providing telecommunications services); 332(c)(1)(A) (limiting common carriage regulation 
to commercial mobile services, defined in § 332(d)(1)). 
133 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
134 See Genevieve Lakier, The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom of Speech, 134 HARV. L. 
REV. 2299, 2316–18, 2324–29 (2021); Brent Skorup & Joseph Kane, The FCC and Quasi-Common 
Carriage: A Case Study of Agency Survival, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 631, 647–61 (2017). 
135 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7) (reasonable access), 315(a) (equal access). 
136 See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (overturning 
the last vestiges of the Fairness Doctrine). 
137 Id. §§ 531 (public, educational, and governmental access), 532 (leased access), 534 (must 
carry). 
138 Lakier, supra note 134, at 2318; see CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122–23, 
126, 128–31 (1973); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 681 (1998). 
139 This is not to say that Lakier supports this outcome. She follows Tim Wu in arguing for a 
1:463]  First Amendment, Common Carriers, and Public Accommodations 485 
of such obligations impermissibly burdens private actors’ free speech rights.  
To date, the Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality of quasi-
common carriage duties imposed on the broadcasting and cable industries based 
on rationales that do not generalize to other forms of communication.140 The 
Court upheld the broadcast access requirements based on the scarcity doctrine,141 
which the Court has recognized does not apply to cable and the Internet142 and 
from which the Court appears to be distancing itself even with respect to broad-
casting.143  
The Supreme Court offered its most complete articulation of the framework 
for analyzing such questions in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, which 
addressed the constitutionality of the must carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act 
requiring cable operators to offer free channel capacity to all full-power local tele-
vision stations operating in their service area.144 The Court began by acknowledg-
ing that cable operators exercise editorial discretion over their channels.145 In ad-
dition, “laws that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special 
treatment pose a particular danger of abuse by the State and so are always subject 
to at least some degree of heightened First Amendment scrutiny.”146  
 
“second free speech tradition” that embraces nondiscriminatory access to communications media. 
Id. at 2319 (citing TIM WU, BROOKINGS INST., IS FILTERING CENSORSHIP? THE SECOND FREE SPEECH 
TRADITION 2 (2010), https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-filtering-censorship-the-second-free-
speech-tradition). This position has the support of scholars such as POOL, supra note 117, at 106. 
Lakier acknowledges that “[u]nder current state action rules such a conclusion would be unimagi-
nable.” Lakier, supra note 134, at 2318; accord, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 
S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019). For my thoughts on calls to revise the state action doctrine, see Yoo, su-
pra note 27, at 331–34. 
140 For my initial discussion of the death of the technology specific approach to the First 
Amendment, see Yoo, supra note 27, at 266–92. 
141 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386–89 (1969) (offering the classic state-
ment of the scarcity rationale to uphold the Fairness Doctrine); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 
395–96 (1981) (relying on Red Lion to uphold the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)). 
142 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (Internet); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC 512 
U.S. 622, 637–39 (1994) (cable); see also infra notes 147, 242–246 and accompanying text. 
143 Yoo, supra note 27, at 290–92. 
144 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
145 Id. at 636. 
146 Id. at 640–41 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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In terms of the precise level of scrutiny to be applied, the Turner Court reject-
ed arguments that the lower First Amendment standard governing broadcasting 
should also apply to cable.147 At the same time, it declined to accord cable the 
stronger level of protection accorded to newspapers.148 In support of both conclu-
sions, the Court specified that it was the “special physical characteristics” and 
“fundamental technological difference[s]”—not “market dysfunction,” “eco-
nomic characteristics,” or local monopoly power—that determined the level of 
scrutiny that would be applied, citing among other things its prior decision in 
Tornillo.149 Specifically, cable television is not subject to the “physical limitations 
of the electromagnetic spectrum” applicable to broadcasting.150 At the same time, 
“the physical connection between the television set and the cable network gives 
the cable operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the 
television programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home.”151 The 
former justified applying stronger scrutiny than that applied to broadcasting. The 
latter justified subjecting structural, content-neutral regulation to intermediate 
rather than strict scrutiny. Moreover, as in PruneYard, viewers were unlikely to 
attribute the views expressed to the property owner.152 
The emergence of competition from direct broadcast satellite providers 
(“DBS”) (such as DirecTV and the Dish Network), multichannel video provided 
by telephone companies (through Verizon’s FIOS and AT&T’s U-verse ser-
vices),153 and new over-the-top services (such as Netflix, Hulu, Sling, Disney+, 
HBO+, and Peacock) have undercut the bottleneck rationale with respect to cable 
television. And as discussed in greater detail below, courts have rejected it with 
respect to broadband as well.154 
 
147 Id. at 637–39. 
148 Id. at 655–56. 
149 Id. at 639–40 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248–58 (1974)), 
656 (comparing cable operators to “a daily newspaper . . . [that] may enjoy monopoly status in a 
given locale). 
150 Id. at 639. 
151 Id. at 656. 
152 Id. at 655–56 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980)). 
153 Yoo, Technologies of Control, supra note 120, at 765–66. 
154 See infra notes 233–235 and accompanying text. 
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The D.C. Circuit decision upholding the constitutionality of the 2015 Open 
Internet Order relied on a different aspect of Turner to avoid engaging in an ex-
tended First Amendment analysis: the distinction between common carriage ser-
vices and services over which the network exercises editorial discretion.155 Unlike 
the newspaper in Tornillo or the cable companies in Turner, “the exercise of edi-
torial discretion is entirely absent with respect to broadband providers subject to 
the Order,” which act as “neutral, indiscriminate platforms for transmission of 
speech of any and all users,” playing a role “analogous to that of telephone com-
panies.”156 Thus, “[t]hose obligations affect a common carrier’s neutral transmis-
sion of others’ speech, not a carrier’s communication of its own message.”157 The 
decision also analogized to PruneYard and Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) on grounds that viewers were unlikely to regard 
the carried content as “reflect[ing the] broadband providers’ editorial judgment 
or viewpoint.”158 
The situation would be quite different if the broadband provider served as 
more than a mere pass through. The court acknowledged that broadband provid-
ers enjoy full First Amendment protection should they decide to provide their 
own content.159 And it noted that the First Amendment might also be implicated 
should a broadband provider decide to filter the content accessible through its 
network.160 The FCC’s representation that such conduct fell outside of the 2015 
 
155 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 742–43 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Note that technically 
that decision involved a statute that explicitly invoked common carriage rather than establish a 
quasi-common carriage regime. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. The opinion’s 
insights into the proper application of Turner remain germane for both common carriers and qua-
si-common carriers. 
156 USTA, 825 F.3d at 743. 
157 Id. at 740. 
158 Id. at 743 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 63–65 
(2006); and PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 86–88). 
159 Id. at 741–42 (“Of course, insofar as a broadband provider might offer its own content—
such as a news or weather site—separate from its internet access service, the provider would re-
ceive the same protection under the First Amendment as other producers of internet content.”). 
160 Id. at 743 (“If a broadband provider nonetheless were to choose to exercise editorial discre-
tion—for instance, by picking a limited set of websites to carry and offering that service as a curat-
ed internet experience—it might then qualify as a First Amendment speaker.”). 
488 Journal of Free Speech Law [2021 
Order obviated the need for the court to consider that possibility further.161 
The two members of the panel majority advanced the same reasoning in their 
concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc responding to then-Judge Ka-
vanaugh’s dissent from the same order.162 According to the panel majority’s con-
currence, “[t]he key to understanding why” the net neutrality rule complies with 
the First Amendment “lies in perceiving when a broadband provider falls within 
the rule’s coverage.”163 It applies only to broadband Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) that “represent that their services allow Internet end users to access all or 
substantially all content on the Internet, without alteration, blocking, or editorial 
intervention.”164 As such, “the net neutrality rule applies only to ‘those broadband 
providers that hold themselves out as neutral, indiscriminate conduits for trans-
mission of speech of any and all users.’”165 The net neutrality mandate simply “re-
quires the ISP to abide by its representation and honor its customers’ ensuing ex-
pectations.”166 The concurrence again distinguished Turner on the grounds that 
the cable operators at issue in that case engaged in editorial discretion over the 
content they carry, whereas “ISPs subject to the net neutrality rule represent that 
they do not.”167  
At the same time, the 2015 Order “specifies that an ISP remains ‘free to offer 
“edited” services’ without becoming subject to the rule’s requirements.”168 Thus, 
ISPs that choose to offer a “curated experience,” such as one limited to family 
friendly websites, or to “filter[] . . . content into fast (and slow) lanes based on the 
ISP’s commercial interest,” would fall outside the net neutrality rules so long as 
 
161 Id. 
162 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC (USTA), 855 F.3d 381, 426–35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
163 Id. at 388 (Srinivasan, J., joined by Tatel, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for re-
hearing en banc). 
164 Id. (quoting Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand, 
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5869 ¶ 549 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open In-
ternet Order]). 
165 Id. at 389 (quoting USTA, 825 F.3d at 743). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 391. 
168 Id. at 389 (quoting 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 164, at 5872 ¶ 556). 
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the ISP clearly disclosed its intentions to do so.169 The fact that no ISP had yet ex-
pressed interest in doing so made it unnecessary for the panel to further analyze 
that possibility.170  
The D.C. Circuit thus placed potentially dispositive weight on the distinction 
between providers that hold themselves out as serving the public indiscriminately 
and those exercising editorial discretion over the content they carry. The former 
may be treated as common carriers for First Amendment purposes and be forced 
to carry speech only if doing so does not affect their own expression or force them 
to become associated with ideas with which they disagree. The court implicitly 
followed its prior decision striking down the 2010 Open Internet Order, which 
accepted that common carriage duties could apply to edge providers as well as 
residential customers.171 In so doing, it ignored the precedent that common car-
riage duties apply only to consumers and do not apply to competitors or other 
service providers.172  
The D.C. Circuit’s reliance on the common carrier status of the ISPs neces-
sarily gave it no opportunity to opine on how the First Amendment applies to 
quasi-common carriers. Thus, unless the Supreme Court revisits the state action 
doctrine or its decisions holding that the justifications for applying a lower First 
Amendment standard to broadcast and cable regulation are inapplicable to the 
Internet, the precedents applying the First Amendment to quasi-common car-
riage are unlikely to change the constitutional analysis. 
3. Non-common-carriage services 
An additional nuance arises from the fact that firms are increasingly provid-
ing both common carriage and non-common-carriage services. On the one hand, 
firms that previously provided only content have become more involved in net-
working, with Google initiating its fiber project in Kansas City and other metro-
politan areas, Google and Microsoft building networks covering the United States, 
and Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon becoming the largest constructors 
 
169 Id. at 389–90. 
170 Id. at 390. 
171 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
172 The Express Package Cases, 117 U.S. 1 (1885); HUBER ET AL., supra note 55, § 1.3.1, at 13–
16, § 5.1.1, 407–08. 
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of undersea cables in recent years.173 On the other hand, ISPs have begun offering 
more content, demonstrated eloquently by Comcast’s acquisition of NBC Univer-
sal, AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner, and Verizon’s acquisitions of Yahoo! 
and America Online. The latter two examples may be unraveling, as did News 
Corp.’s acquisition of DirecTV, but similar transactions may still emerge in the 
future. 
Courts have made clear that common carriage regulation is determined on an 
activity-by-activity basis rather than an entity basis. For example, in FTC v. AT&T 
Mobility LLC, the Ninth Circuit confronted whether AT&T was a “common car-
rier” exempted from FTC jurisdiction.174 The Ninth Circuit held that “common 
carrier” is an activity-based category, so that an entity is a common carrier “only 
to the extent that [it] is engaging in common-carrier services.”175 The activity-
based framework reflects the obvious: in the twenty-first century, “[a] phone 
company is no longer just a phone company.”176 An entity therefore bears the 
special burdens and earns the special privileges of common carriers only when it 
is acting as a common carrier. 
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit in AT&T Mobility explored the 
common-law backdrop of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The court ob-
served that activity-based distinctions originated in the Nineteenth Century, if not 
earlier.177 What is obvious now was obvious then, too: A business can undertake 
different enterprises, and they need not all be common carriage. A common carri-
er could operate an amusement park in 1912 just as one can today, but the provi-
sion of shipping services on the Great Lakes bears little logical or legal connection 
to the bookkeeping for the merry-go-round fares.178 So, the Ninth Circuit noted, 
courts employed an activity-based framework for common carriers and continued 
 
173 Christopher S. Yoo, Paul Baran, Network Theory, and the Past, Present, and Future of the 
Internet, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 161, 181–82 (2018). 
174 883 F.3d 848, 850 (9th Cir. 2018). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 851. 
177 Id. at 858. 
178 Id. at 859 (citing Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 205 
(1912)). 
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to do so throughout the 20th century.179 Although the Ninth Circuit drew this 
conclusion in the context of the FTC Act, it noted that five circuits came to the 
same conclusion under the communications statute.180 
This conclusion should come as no surprise. The mere fact that Google initi-
ated a residential broadband system in Kansas City should not convert all aspects 
of Google’s operations into common carriage. Two lines of authority—one on 
dial-a-porn and the other on the now-defunct cable-telco cross-ownership ban—
confirm that common carriers enjoy substantial First Amendment rights with re-
spect to non-common carriage services.181 
a. Dial-a-porn 
Dial-a-porn providers charge users who dial premium-rate telephone num-
bers (using prefixes such as 900 or 976) higher than normal rates to access prere-
corded, sexually suggestive messages. In 1983, Congress responded to the growth 
of this practice by legislation criminalizing the use of a telephone to provide any 
obscene or indecent communications to a minor and directed the FCC to issue 
implementing regulations.182  
As the constitutionality of the FCC’s efforts was being litigated,183 a number of 
courts upheld local telephone companies’ exercise of independent business judg-
ment not to carry dial-a-porn.184 For example, in a decision focusing primarily on 
 
179 Id. at 859–61. 
180 Id. at 860–61 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 594 F.2d 720, 724–
25 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979); Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 19 F.3d 1475, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. 
Comm’rs v. FCC (NARUC II), 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Comput. & Commc’ns Indus. 
Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 209 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Eagleview Techs., Inc. v. MDS Assocs., 190 
F.3d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 58–59 (2d 
Cir. 2006)). 
181 For my initial discussion of these cases, see Yoo, Myth of the Internet, supra note 120, at 
751–57. 
182 Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-214, § 8, 
97 Stat. 1467, 1470. 
183 See the history recounted in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 
120–23 (1989). 
184 See Carlin Commc’ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1297 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Carlin Commc’n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Network Commc’ns v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 703 F. Supp. 1267, 1275 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
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state action, the Eleventh Circuit held that the decision not to carry dial-a-porn 
did not violate the First Amendment, reasoning that as “[a] private business,” 
Southern Bell “is free to choose the content of messages with which its name and 
reputation will be associated.”185 In so holding, the court emphasized that the 
premium-rate service used for dial-a-porn “is not part of Southern Bell’s function 
as a common carrier and therefore is not subject to the requirements regarding 
equal access that apply to telecommunications services offered by Southern Bell as 
a common carrier.”186 
The Ninth Circuit similarly held that the initial termination of a dial-a-porn 
provider done at the behest of a deputy county attorney constituted state action 
and violated the First Amendment, but a subsequent policy against carrying dial-
a-porn unilaterally imposed by a telephone company did not.187 Decisions wheth-
er or not to carry pornography are not for the state to make: “[I]t is a thing that 
private parties alone—newspapers, television networks, publishers, and so on—
may do.”188  
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Sable endorsed this conclusion. While agreeing 
with the decision to apply strict scrutiny to strike down as unduly restrictive the 
federal statute restricting access to indecent telephone messages, he noted that 
“while we hold the Constitution prevents Congress from banning indecent speech 
in this fashion, we do not hold that the Constitution requires public utilities to 
carry it.”189  
Congress responded by enacting legislation limiting dial-a-porn to subscrib-
ers who had previously requested access to it in writing.190 In upholding this revi-
sion, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that “[c]arriers are private companies” that are 
“free under the Constitution to terminate service to dial-a-porn operators alto-
gether.”191 
 
185 S. Bell, 802 F.2d at 1361. 
186 Id. at 1361 n.5. My initial analysis of these cases failed to emphasize this point. Yoo, Myth 
of the Internet, supra note 120, at 754. 
187 Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1295–97. 
188 Id. at 1297. 
189 Sable, 492 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
190 47 U.S.C. § 223(c)(1) (enacted in November 1989). 
191 Info. Providers’ Coal. for Def. of First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 877 (9th Cir. 
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b. The cable-telco cross-ownership rule  
The line of cases overturning the FCC’s then-extant rule prohibiting tele-
phone companies from offering cable television services further confirms that the 
First Amendment protects non-common carriage services provided by common 
carriers. The FCC imposed this rule in 1970, justified by the need to promote 
competition in the burgeoning cable television industry,192 and Congress codified 
it in 1984.193  
In a series of cases, courts uniformly followed Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC194 to invalidate this restriction as insufficiently narrowly tailored.195 
Two months after the Supreme Court heard oral argument on these cases on De-
cember 6, 1995, Congress rendered them moot by repealing the cable-telco cross-
ownership ban as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996196 with the support 
of both the FCC and Department of Justice Antitrust Division.197 The fact that the 
Supreme Court did not reach the merits of this argument takes nothing away 
from the uniform conclusion that the First Amendment protects common carri-
ers’ right to provide services over which they exercise editorial discretion.  
Together, the cases on quasi-common-carriers and non-common-carriage 
services both support according strong First Amendment protection to services 
over which common carriers exercise editorial discretion. These cases embrace 
 
1991). 
192 Application of Telephone Cos. for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished 
to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 
325 ¶ 49 (1970), aff’d sub nom. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971). 
193 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 
(previously codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1994)). 
194 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
195 See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and re-
manded for consideration of mootness, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of 
Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 190 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded for consideration of 
mootness, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); S. New England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211, 217 (D. 
Conn. 1995); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, No. Civ. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 779761, at *2 (D. 
Me. Dec. 8, 1994); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N.D. Ala. 1994); 
Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
196 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 302(b), 110 Stat. 56, 124 (repeal-
ing 47 U.S.C. § 533). 
197 See U.S. West, 48 F.3d at 1097; Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 187–88. 
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the idea that common carriers have the First Amendment right to offer these ser-
vices. When they choose to do so, they enjoy the same level of First Amendment 
protection as newspapers, broadcasters, and publishers, absent some unique phys-
ical characteristic (not an economic characteristic) that inherently limits service to 
a single provider. As Justice Thomas observed, “Common carriers are private en-
tities and may, consistent with the First Amendment, exercise editorial discretion 
in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition.”198  
B. Public accommodations 
In addition, Justice Thomas suggests that laws prohibiting discrimination in 
public accommodations serve as a precedent for restricting the speech of private 
companies. This argument ignores the fact that the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence on public accommodations limits the government’s 
ability to mandate access rather than authorizing more stringent regulation. 
Two recent cases lay out the extent to which the First Amendment protects 
public accommodations. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual 
Group of Boston, Inc., the Supreme Court held that applying a state statute prohib-
iting discrimination based on sexual orientation in any place of public accommo-
dations to force parade organizers to allow a gay, lesbian, and bisexual organiza-
tion to participate as a parade unit violated the First Amendment.199 Parades and 
the decisions about which groups are permitted to participate in them are inher-
ently expressive.200 Thus, relying on public accommodations law to require the 
inclusion of a particular group effectively compelled the parade organizer to make 
a statement that it would have preferred not to make.201 Audiences were likely to 
perceive the inclusion of the organization in the parade as carrying an expressive 
message.202 This distinguished Hurley from PruneYard and Turner, in which the 
decision to carry particular content was not perceived as implying endorsement of 
the messages contained therein.203 The Court also noted language in its expressive 
 
198 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 825 (1996) (Thom-
as, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
199 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
200 Id. at 569–70. 
201 Id. at 573. 
202 Id. at 575–77. 
203 Id. at 575–78. 
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association decisions recognizing that the state laws at issue in those cases pre-
served clubs’ ability to control the messages with which they are associated by 
permitting them to exclude members who espouse views with which they disa-
greed.204 
The Supreme Court drew a similar conclusion in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, which held that application of a state public accommodations statute pre-
venting the Boy Scouts from revoking the membership of an adult leader who was 
“an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist” violated the First Amendment.205 
The Court concluded that “[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a 
group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of 
that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or 
private viewpoints.”206 Under Hurley and the associational freedom cases, requir-
ing the inclusion of some speech was permissible only if doing so “would not ma-
terially interfere with the ideas that the organization sought to express”207 and did 
not impose a “‘serious burden’ on the organization’s rights of expressive associa-
tion.”208 In this case, forcing the Boy Scouts to accept a leader from a particular 
group would force it to convey a message that it did not want to send and would 
thus violate the First Amendment.209 
The Court further developed its expressive association jurisprudence in 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR), which re-
jected law schools’ challenge to the Solomon Amendment’s requirement that ed-
ucational institutions receiving federal funds give military recruiters the same ac-
cess given to other recruiters.210 The Court reasoned that the amendment “neither 
limits what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything,”211 and the 
 
204 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579–81 (citing New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 
U.S. 1, 13 (1988); and Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984)). 
205 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
206 Id. at 648 (citing N.Y. State Club Ass’n, 487 U.S. at 13). 
207 Id. at 658 (citing Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626, and Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of 
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)). 
208 Id. at 658 (citing Hurley, Roberts, Duarte, and New York State Club Ass’n). 
209 Id. at 653. 
210 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
211 Id. at 60. 
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affected conduct is not “inherently expressive.”212 Moreover, as in PruneYard, 
others were unlikely to interpret granting recruiters access as an endorsement of 
the recruiters’ views.213 
The teaching of these cases is clear: The government may mandate access to 
public accommodations only when doing so does not interfere with their expres-
sive activity or force them to associate themselves with a message with which they 
disagree. Note that the fact that the state statutes at issue in Hurley and Dale de-
clared the respondents to be public accommodations played no role in the consti-
tutional analysis. It was the effect on the respondents’ speech that mattered, alt-
hough the test essentially overlapped with the common law rule for determining 
what constitutes a public accommodation. 
C. Summation 
The precedents on common carriage and public accommodations lead to the 
same conclusion. Mandating access does not violate the First Amendment if the 
mandate does not interfere with the ability of the entity forced to grant access to 
express itself and if others are unlikely to interpret carriage of that content as an 
endorsement of the messages contained therein.  
In addition, judicial precedents establish two frameworks for determining the 
appropriate level of First Amendment protection for common carriers and public 
accommodations. On the one hand, entities that hold themselves out as not mak-
ing individualized business decisions about to serve are regarded as common car-
riers or public accommodations. At the same time, firms are regarded as First 
Amendment speakers if they exercise editorial discretion over the speech they car-
ry or if others will regard that carriage as an endorsement of the content being 
carried. This justifies why mandatory access requirements imposed on common 
carriers and public accommodations are widely regarded as constitutional. The 
commercial speech/privacy cases also suggest a potential First Amendment right 
to use information derived from providing that service. 
On the other hand, entities that opt to exercise editorial discretion over some 
services are neither common carriers nor public accommodations with respect to 
those services. Instead, they are speakers with respect to those services and as such 
are entitled to First Amendment protection, and Turner’s rationale for imposing 
 
212 Id. at 66. 
213 Id. at 65 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88); accord id. at 69. 
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intermediate rather than strict scrutiny logically does not apply. 
The D.C. Circuit’s acknowledgement of an ISP’s First Amendment right to 
offer services that curate or filter access to content raises a conundrum. Among 
other things, the 2010 and 2015 Open Internet Orders adopted bright-line rules 
prohibiting the blocking of any content, application, or service.214 The D.C. Cir-
cuit’s reasoning suggests that prohibiting blocking raises serious First Amend-
ment issues. The court avoided the question by noting that the restrictions apply 
only to BIAS and that services that curate or filter content fall outside the rules. 
But allowing ISPs to avoid the rule simply by stating that they are blocking certain 
services would effectively render the no-blocking rule a nullity that is as easy to 
evade as the definition of common carriage as holding out.215 Alternatively, any 
approach that gives the no-blocking rule any bite at all will necessarily find the 
First Amendment not so easy to sidestep. 
III. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NET NEUTRALITY, DIGITAL PLATFORMS 
AND PRIVACY? 
The jurisprudence on common carriers and public accommodations indicates 
that editorial discretion plays two key roles. First, the exercise of that discretion 
means that the entity is not holding itself out as serving the public, which takes it 
outside the definitions of common carriage and public accommodations. Second, 
even if it is regarded as a common carrier or public accommodation, the exercise 
of editorial discretion entitles it to the First Amendment. 
If an entity holds itself out as simply passing through speech created by others 
and is not perceived as endorsing the messages contained therein, it is a common 
carrier or public accommodation and not a speaker for First Amendment purpos-
es. Conversely, the First Amendment gives firms the right to offer services over 
which they exercise editorial discretion even if they possess monopoly power. If 
they do exercise editorial discretion, they are not considered common carriers or 
public accommodations with respect to those services, and those services fall out-
side the justification for according lower levels of First Amendment protection. 
This synthesis has significant implications for three high-profile issues cur-
rently confronting communications policy. The first is net neutrality. The second 
is the regulation of the speech of digital platforms. The third is the regulation of 
 
214 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 164, at 5607–08 ¶¶ 14–19. 
215 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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online privacy. 
A. Specialized Services Under Net Neutrality 
The D.C. Circuit’s analysis of the First Amendment issues raised by the 2015 
Open Internet Order focused entirely on the provisions mandating nondiscrimi-
nation in what the Order called broadband Internet access service (BIAS).216 The 
Order defined BIAS as mass-market retail services that provide the capability to 
exchange data with all or substantially all Internet endpoints.217 
The facial nature of the challenge to the rule precluded the court from consid-
ering the constitutionality of a separate type of service regulated under net neu-
trality that the 2010 Order called specialized service218 and that the 2015 Order re-
defined as non-BIAS service.219 Specialized services share capacity with BIAS but 
do not reach large parts of the Internet and are application specific.220 They are 
 
216 The 2015 Order adopted bright-line rules prohibiting blocking, throttling, and paid priori-
tization and a general-conduct rule prohibiting unreasonable interference or disadvantage. 2015 
Open Internet Order, supra note 164, at 5607–08 ¶¶ 14–19. This terminology was heavily influ-
enced by the fate of the 2010 Open Internet Order, which relied primarily on the FCC’s Title I 
authority to adopt blocking and nondiscrimination rules. Preserving the Open Internet, Report 
and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17906 ¶ 1, 17941–51 ¶¶ 62–79, 17968–72 ¶¶ 117–123 (2010) 
[2010 Open Internet Order]. The D.C. Circuit invalidated the 2010 Order because the FCC had 
authority to mandate nondiscrimination only for Title II services, not Title I services. Verizon v. 
FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650–59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The 2015 Order responded by reclassifying BIAS as a 
Title II service, 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 164, at 5726–27 ¶ 289, 5729–30 ¶ 295, but 
also justified its rules under Title I as a hedge against potential judicial invalidation, id. at 5725–26 
¶ 288, 5728–29 ¶ 294. Because the Verizon court clearly held that “nondiscrimination” require-
ments exceeded the FCC’s authority under Title I, the FCC assiduously avoided using that term in 
the 2015 Order in case its attempt to reclassify BIAS as a Title II service failed. The use of the terms 
throttling, paid prioritization, and unreasonable interference/disadvantage are best regarded as 
attempts to mandate nondiscrimination without actually using that term. 
217 Id. at 5682 ¶ 187. 
218 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 216, at 17965–66 ¶¶ 112–114. 
219 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 164, at 5696–99 ¶¶ 207–213. This new moniker 
contains an unfortunate redundancy. If the acronym is expanded, non-BIAS service is properly 
read as non-broadband Internet access service service. The European Union has followed the 2010 
Order and refers to such services as specialised services. Christopher S. Yoo & Jesse Lambert, 5G 
and Net Neutrality, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET – INNOVATION, INTEGRATION AND SUSTAINA-
BILITY 221, 232 (Guenter Knieps & Volcker Stocker eds., 2019). 
220 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 148, at 5696 ¶ 207, 5697 ¶ 209. 
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also likely to involve enhanced quality of service that exceeds that of the tradition-
al best-efforts Internet.221 Examples include Voice over Internet Protocol, e-
readers, heart monitors, energy consumption sensors, automobile telematics, and 
educational applications and content.222  
The FCC was concerned that ISPs would use widespread adoption of special-
ized services either to evade the network neutrality rules or to divert resources 
away from the traditional best-efforts Internet.223 As a result, it promised to moni-
tor the development of specialized services and intervene on a case-by-case basis 
as necessary.224 
Courts that have considered the constitutionality of restrictions on broadband 
providers have uniformly concluded that ISPs possess significantly less bottleneck 
control than did cable operators at the time Turner was decided.225 Although the 
technological environment has evolved away from the dial-up access that charac-
terized the Internet when those courts rendered those decisions, a vigorous com-
petition for broadband customers has since emerged between cable and telephone 
companies.226 In addition, recent surveys indicate that consumers are increasingly 
opting for mobile broadband as the best solution for Internet access.227 
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Consider, for example, the decision in Comcast Cablevision of Broward Coun-
ty, Inc. v. Broward County, in which the Southern District of Florida held that an 
ordinance requiring cable broadband providers to give other ISPs nondiscrimina-
tory access to their transport services violated the First Amendment.228 The court 
began by observing that the fact that “[c]able operators control no bottleneck 
monopoly over access to the Internet” took the case outside the reasoning of 
Turner and instead brought it within the ambit of Tornillo.229 The court concluded 
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate First Amendment standard.230 Out of an 
abundance of caution, it nonetheless applied intermediate scrutiny, concluding 
that the lack of monopoly power rendered the harm “the ordinance is purported 
to address . . . non-existent.”231 As support, the court cited FCC reports monitor-
ing the growing competition among cable modem service, digital subscriber lines, 
fiber to the home, satellite, and radio broadband.232 Finding that the county had 
“proffered no substantial evidence demonstrating that actual harm exists,” the 
court concluded that the ordinance was based on nothing more than “‘the mere 
assertion of a dysfunction or failure in a speech market’” that was “not sufficient 
to shield a speech regulation from the First Amendment” and held that the ordi-
nance failed even the lower, intermediate scrutiny standard.233 
The lines of authority discussed above confirm that ISPs have the First 
Amendment right to deploy specialized services that limit access or give preferen-
tial treatment to specific content for editorial or commercial reasons.234 The fact 
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that ISPs offering specialized services are exercising discretion over them takes 
them outside the deferential standard applied to common carriers and subjects 
them to heightened scrutiny.235 The existence of multiple last-mile broadband op-
tions, along with the increasing reliance on mobile broadband as a substitute for 
fixed-line service making the industry ever more competitive, distinguishes BIAS 
from the unique physical characteristics that justified not subjecting structural 
regulation of cable operators to strict scrutiny in Turner.236  
Strict scrutiny requires that the restriction must not burden speech of a par-
ticular content and must not compel the regulated entity to appear to endorse ide-
as with which it disagrees.237 Even under intermediate scrutiny, the restriction 
must be unrelated to the suppression of speech, and the incidental restriction on 
speech must be no greater than essential to furthering an important or substantial 
government interest.238 It remains possible that limiting an ISP’s ability to deploy 
specialized services or requiring that it devote more resources to the traditional 
Internet may impermissibly burden its ability to offer the curated or filtered access 
that the D.C. Circuit has recognized that the First Amendment entitles it to offer. 
B. Digital Platforms 
The extent to which the First Amendment permits government regulation of 
digital platforms presents another controversial topic. For example, then-Judge 
Kavanaugh’s dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in the review of the 
2015 Open Internet Order suggested that the panel majority’s approach would 
permit “regulat[ion of] the editorial decisions of Facebook and Google, of 
MSNBC and Fox, of NYTimes.com and WSJ.com, of YouTube and Twitter,” ask-
ing rhetorically, “Can the Government really force Facebook and Google and all 
of those other entities to operate as common carriers? Can the Government really 
impose forced-carriage or equal-access obligations on YouTube and Twitter? If 
the Government’s theory in this case were accepted, then the answers would be 
yes.”239  
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The concurrence authored by members of the panel majority disagreed, 
pointing out that “web platforms such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, and 
YouTube, or a widely used commercial marketplace such as Amazon . . . are not 
considered common carriers that hold themselves out as affording neutral, indis-
criminate access to their platform without any editorial filtering.”240 The concur-
rence concedes that an entity subject to such regulation could avoid it simply by 
clarifying that it is exercising discretion over the content it carries.241 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reno v. ACLU left little doubt that Internet 
content providers benefit from strong First Amendment protection.242 Although 
the Court could have simply followed Sable’s reasoning that content restrictions 
are impermissible when accessing content requires affirmative steps and when 
viable age verification systems exist,243 the Court offered a more expansive defense 
of Internet speakers’ free speech rights. It began by rejecting calls to extend the 
lower level First Amendment protection applied to broadcasting to the Internet 
speech for the simple reason that the volume of online content is not constrained 
by physical scarcity.244 Quite the contrary, “the content on the Internet is as di-
verse as human thought.”245 In addition, it not only encompasses traditional ser-
vices such as print, audio, video, and still images; it also enables new forms of 
communication such as real-time dialogue, chat rooms, web pages, mail explod-
ers, and newsgroups, the reach of which allows “any person . . . [to] become a 
town crier” or “a pamphleteer” to an extent previously impossible.246 The Court 
thus found “no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that 
should be applied to this medium.”247 
The recent district court decision in NetChoice LLC v. Moody addressed the 
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constitutionality of regulating digital platforms when it enjoined a Florida statute 
that barred large social media providers from removing or deprioritizing content 
posted by any qualified candidates for office or by journalistic enterprises.248 The 
court began by noting that “[a]lthough a primary function of social-media pro-
viders is to receive content from users and in turn to make the content available to 
other uses, the providers routinely manage the content.”249 Indeed, the legislative 
record was replete with statements by state officials acknowledging that social 
media providers exercise editorial judgment, mostly consisting of complaints that 
they have exercised that judgment in an ideologically biased manner.250 
Moreover, the possibility that “one or a few powerful entities have gained a 
monopoly in the marketplace of ideas” does not increase “state authority to regu-
late speech.”251 Tornillo teaches that “the concentration of market power among 
large social-media providers does not change the governing First Amendment 
principles.”252 Thus, Justice Thomas’s characterization of Google as a gatekeep-
er253 does little to advance the First Amendment analysis.  
The district court then addressed the state’s claim that “social-media provid-
ers are more like common carriers” that simply “transport[] information from 
one person not another.”254 The court found some truth to that argument, noting 
that social media sites exercise less editorial discretion than newspapers and post 
over 99% of their material without reviewing it.255 At the same time, Hurley and 
other precedents established “that a private party that creates or uses its editorial 
judgment to select content for publication cannot be required by the government 
to also publish other content in the same manner.”256  
The speech affected by the statute clearly consisted of the latter type. Indeed, 
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the statute was “concerned . . . primarily with the most ideologically sensitive cas-
es,” which “are the very cases on which the platforms are most likely to exercise 
editorial judgment,” in contrast to “the routine posting of material without inci-
dent.”257 In short, “[t]he State’s announced purpose of balancing the discussion—
reining in the ideology of the large social-media providers—is precisely the kind 
of state action held unconstitutional in Tornillo.”258 Moreover, not only did the 
statute force social media companies to alter their own speech; in contrast to FAIR 
and PruneYard, it created serious risks of having speech with which such compa-
nies disagreed attributed to them.259 
The court thus accorded social media sites full First Amendment protec-
tion.260 The court regarded the statute’s focus on deplatforming of candidates and 
material posted “by or about a candidate” to be “about as content-based as it 
gets.”261 In addition, the factual record, headlined by statements by the governor 
and lieutenant governor, clearly indicated “that the actual motivation for this leg-
islation was hostility to the social media platform’s perceived liberal viewpoint.”262 
Both the content-based and viewpoint-based nature of the restrictions subjected 
the statute to strict and not intermediate scrutiny, as did the limitation of the stat-
ute to large entities and journalistic enterprises.263 
The statute came “nowhere close” to surviving strict scrutiny, and “the State 
has advanced no argument suggesting” that it could.264 Supreme Court precedent 
dictates that leveling the speech playing field is not a legitimate state interest, and 
the statute was not narrowly tailored.265 Though the content-based and viewpoint-
based nature of the restrictions made strict scrutiny the appropriate standard, the 
statute was insufficiently narrowly tailored and designed to achieve any govern-
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ment interest to survive even intermediate scrutiny.266  
These precedents dim the prospects of any attempt to invoke common car-
riage or public accommodations law to correct perceived ideological imbalances 
on social media. The example illustrates the problems with alternative definitions 
of common carriage. As noted above, whether an actor holds an economic mo-
nopoly is irrelevant to the First Amendment analysis.267 Regarding transportation 
and communication as defining categories, any definition of communication 
broad enough to include social media would also encompass actors such as news-
papers that clearly enjoy full First Amendment protection.  
Social media also have not been historically engaged in transportation, and 
the networks they are starting to build are proprietary and not open to the pub-
lic.268 Nor have social media sites received franchises or licenses from the govern-
ment that form the basis of a quid pro quo. One searches in vain for any sugges-
tion that social media providers obtained the immunity provided by the Commu-
nications Decency Act269 in exchange for classification as a common carrier or 
public accommodation.270 Any deal implicit in that statute must be internal to the 
statue itself.271 
In the end, the common carriage status of social media companies turns on 
whether they hold themselves out as serving all members of the public without 
making individualized business decisions, and their First Amendment treatment 
depends on whether they exercise editorial discretion over the content carried on 
their sites. They almost certainly do both, but with respect to the content that lies 
at the heart of the debates over deplatforming, they generally do exercise signifi-
cant editorial discretion and are increasingly being held accountable for the con-
tent they convey.272 Absent a major change in business practices, social media 
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companies exercise too much discretion over the content they host to be regarded 
as common carriers or public accommodations. 
C. Privacy 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in U.S. West confirms that the First Amendment 
protects common carriers’ right to use consumer data they collect.273 Indeed, this 
right may extend far beyond common carriers. As the Sorrell Court held in strik-
ing down a Vermont statute prohibiting certain actors from selling, disclosing, or 
using records of individual physicians’ prescribing practices for marketing pur-
poses, “the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the 
meaning of the First Amendment,”274 quoting language from Bartnicki v. Vopper 
acknowledging that “if the acts of ‘disclosing’ and ‘publishing’ information do 
not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category.”275 
Moreover, the fact that the statute restricts specified actors’ ability to dissemi-
nate prescriber-identifying information made it both content-based and speaker-
based, which justified subjecting it to heightened scrutiny.276 The state’s attempt 
to characterize the restriction it imposed as mere commercial regulation ignored 
the fact that the restriction did not simply impose “an incidental burden on pro-
tected expression”; it imposed “a burden based on the content of speech and the 
identity of the speaker.”277 Ordinarily that fact alone would be sufficient to subject 
the statute to strict scrutiny.278 The fact that the statute failed even the lower 
standard applicable to commercial speech obviated the need for the Court to ad-
dress the state’s arguments about the proper First Amendment standard.279 
A district court applied this framework to privacy regulation imposed on ISPs 
in ACA Connects – America’s Communications Ass’n v. Frey.280 That court fol-
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lowed Sorrell in holding that ISPs’ use of customer data for marketing purposes 
was protected by the First Amendment.281 Perhaps influenced by Sorrell’s reluc-
tance to offer a definitive statement of the proper level of scrutiny, the court chose 
to apply the lower standard governing restrictions of commercial speech.282 The 
court found that the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party, did not provide a sufficient factual basis for resolving the fact-intensive 
inquiries required by Central Hudson on a motion to dismiss.283 
The ACA Connects court clearly recognized that ISPs’ use of consumer data 
for marketing purposes enjoys First Amendment protection. Indeed, the fact that 
the statute restricts a single type of actor (providers of broadband Internet access 
service) from using, disclosing, selling, or permitting access to a particular type of 
data (customer personal information) would seem to bring it squarely within the 
ambit of Sorrell.284 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in U.S. West suggests 
that opt-in consent may represent a less intrusive option that would render the 
statute’s reliance on opt-out consent insufficiently narrowly tailored to survive 
constitutional scrutiny.285 The fact that the record was not yet well enough devel-
oped to finally resolve the merits of the case does nothing to weaken these conclu-
sions. These cases may well have implications beyond ISPs. Sorrell implies that all 
actors may enjoy significant constitutional rights in the data created when they 
provide services, although the exact contours of these rights remain unclear. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Jurisprudence of common carriage and public accommodations tells an amaz-
ingly consistent story. In both lines of cases, the touchstones are whether the firm 
makes individualized business decisions over what content to carry and whether it 
exercises editorial discretion over the content it carries or hosts. If the answer to 
both inquiries is yes, the firm cannot be regarded as a common carrier or public 
accommodation and enjoys broad First Amendment protection. The government 
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cannot impose any access obligations that burden its speech or force it to associate 
itself with a message with which it disagrees. 
Even firms that hold themselves out as serving the public enjoy some First 
Amendment rights. They can avoid common carriage or public accommodations 
status simply by asserting editorial discretion over the services they provide. They 
can also add non-common-carrier services that enjoy full First Amendment pro-
tection. And they can assert the right to sell, disclose, and use the data generated 
by their activities. 
Together, these conclusions suggest that little is gained by simply declaring an 
actor to be a common carrier or public accommodations. Both in terms of defin-
ing the scope of the constitutional categories and in determining the degree of 
First Amendment protection, the key is whether the actor asserts individualized 
business and editorial judgment over the content it carries. The mere attempt to 
attach a label without more accomplishes little. 
